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IN SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION-REPLACING WIDELY DIFFERENT JURISDICTION
RULES WITH A UNIFORM SET OF STANDARDS

The rules for determining the jurisdiction of Canadian courts have
been modernized and codified recently in several provinces. At the same
time, the approach to court jurisdiction that has prevailed among
European Union Countries since 1968 has been updated and extended to
more states.
College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon Canada.
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In this article the author examines these systems in the context of
actions involving commercial contracts (other than insurance or
employment contracts or contracts involving rights in immovable
property) and assesses the extent to which they represent fundamentally
different views as to how to address the problems of recognition and
enforcement of judgments of courts located in different jurisdictions.
The article focuses on the Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings
Transfer Act' promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada,
2003 and the Lugano Convention, 2007.
In May 2009, the revised Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2007 (hereinafter, the "Convention") 2 was ratified by the
European Community on behalf of its member States.
Norway,
Denmark and Switzerland ratified the Convention later in the year. This
Convention embodies most of the provisions of the Lugano Convention
of 1988, which in turn, extended the effect of the Brussels Convention of
1968 to European Free Trade Association states. A slightly modified
version of the Brussels Convention was adopted as internal EU law in
Brussels I (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001) passed on December
22, 2000 (entry into force March 1, 2002). While Brussels I Regulation
and the Convention are separate documents, the structure of the
Convention is based on the principles of Brussels I.
The Canadian Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer
Act (hereinafter, the "Uniform Act") was developed by the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada, an intergovernmental body established to
facilitate the uniformity of provincial and territorial4 legislation.' To
1. The companion Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act
provides a uniform system for registration and enforcement on Canadian judgments. In
this respect, it parallels Section 2 of the Lugano Convention.
2. There are three Protocols to the Convention that address a range of matters
including interface between the Convention and Brussels I, transition, reservations, and
the effect of other conventions to which a state bound by the Convention is a party.
3. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, http://www.ulcc.calen/home/. The
decision of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada ("ULCC") to undertake the
development of legislation in this area was induced by the 1990 request of the Attorneys
General and the Ministers of Justice that the ULCC develop uniform legislation to
provide a modern legal framework for the enforcement of judgments across Canada and
the harmonization of the rules of jurisdiction. This new legal framework was intended to
replace the out-dated and an unsatisfactory approach of the common law. The outcome
of this project was the promulgation of three Uniform Acts: see Uniform Enforcement of
http://www.ulcc.calen/us/index.cfm?
Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act,
sec= 1&sub= l e4, amended by Uniform Enforcement of CanadianJudgments andDecrees
Amendment Act, http://www.ulcc.calen/us/index.cfm?sec=1 &sub= 1e4a; and see Unform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, http://www.ulcc.calen/us/index.cfn?sec=1&
sub=le5.
4. In the following paragraphs, a reference to "province" includes a territory.
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date, it has been enacted in only three Canadian provinces and one
territory; 6 however, there is convincing evidence that its provisions
represent a consensus with respect to most aspects of inter-jurisdictional
recognition and enforcement of money judgments. Furthermore, the
approach of the Act reflects the "new" constitutionally prescribed nonstatutory conflict of laws rules of most other jurisdictions in Canada8
relating to court jurisdiction9 and recognition of judgments.t 0 It is the
5. Judgment recognition and enforcement is, for the most part, a matter within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Canadian provinces.
6. British Columbia, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28; Nova Scotia, S.N.S. 2003 (2nd Sess.), c. 2;
Saskatchewan, S.S. 1997, c. C-41.1, Yukon Territories, S.Y. 2000, c. 7.
7. Law Reform Agencies in two additional provinces have recommended to their
legislatures adoption of the Uniform Act with some modifications. See Enforcement of
Judgments, Final Report, the Alberta Law Institute, No. 94 (2008) and Private
InternationalLaw, Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report 119 (2009). The Ontario
Court of Appeal has recently concluded that the Model Act, for the most part, represents
the present state of the common law in that province. See Van Breda v. Village Resorts
Ltd., 98 O.R.3d 721, 741-44 (2010).
8. See generally Canadian Uniform Court Jurisdictionand Proceedings Transfer
Act. While the Uniform Act was designed to be implemented in both common law
jurisdictions and Quebec (which has a civil law system), significant changes in policy and
drafting would be required for its implementation in that province. Book 10 of the
Quebec Civil Code contains detailed provisions dealing with jurisdiction. Article 3168
provides that, in respect of personal actions of a patrimonial nature, a court has
jurisdiction only where the defendant has his or her domicile or residence in Qu6bec; the
defendant is a legal person not domiciled in Quebec but has an establishment in Qudbec
and the dispute relates to its activities in Qu6bec; the parties have by agreement submitted
to it all existing or future disputes between themselves arising out of a specified legal
relationship; or the defendant submits to its jurisdiction. While some aspects of the test
contained in Article 3168 parallel aspects of sections 3 and 10 of the Uniform Act, it is
quite conceivable that a factor indicating a "real and substantial connection" to another
province falls outside the list of factors set out in Article 3168. The refusal of a Quebec
court to recognize a judgment of the court of another Canadian jurisdiction in this context
may result in violation of the constitution principle set out in the Supreme Court
decisions in Morguard Trust v. De Savoye, 3 S.C.R. 1077 (1990) and Hunt v. T&N plc, 4
S.C.R. 289 (1993), which are treated as establishing a constitutionally based rule for
determining jurisdiction for the purposes of inter-provincial recognition of judgments.
See generally, Genevieve Saumier, The Recognition ofForeignJudgments in Quebec, 81
CAN. BAR. REv. 677, 704 (2002).
9. The Uniform Act deals only with proceedings; it does not deal with common law
rules relating to territorial limits of remedies.
10. The Uniform Law Conference of Canada identified four main purposes for the
Act:
(1) to replace the widely different jurisdictional rules currently used in
Canadian courts with a uniform set of standards for determining jurisdiction;
(2) to bring Canadian jurisdictional rules into line with the principles laid down
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 3
S.C.R. 1077 (1990), and Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers'
Compensation Board), 1 S.C.R. 897 (1993);
(3) by providing uniform jurisdictional standards, to provide an essential
complement to the rule of nation-wide enforceability of judgments in the
uniform Enforcement of CanadianJudgments Act- and
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most recent" Canadian statutory formulation of the recognition and
enforcement principles. As such, it is an appropriate vehicle for
comparing Canadian law with the Convention.12
II.

POLICIES IMPLEMENTED-FACILITATING COMMERCE BY
ACHIEVING A HIGH LEVEL OF PREDICTABILITY IN ENFORCING

(4) to provide, for the first time, a mechanism by which the superior courts of
Canada can transfer litigation to a more appropriate forum in or outside
Canada, if the receiving court accepts such a transfer.
"To achieve the first three purposes, this Act would, for the first time in common law
Canada, give the substantive rules of jurisdiction an express statutory form instead of
leaving them implicit in each province's rules for service of process." However,
the current (non-statutory) rule, which (subject to arguments of forum non
conveniens) permits a court to take jurisdiction on the basis of the
defendant's presence alone, without any other connection between the forum
and the litigation, will therefore no longer apply. This change in the existing
rule is proposed not only on the ground of fairness, but also because the
existing rule is of doubtful constitutional validity, since a defendant's mere
presence in a province is probably not enough to support the constitutional
authority of a province to assert judicial jurisdiction over the defendant. . . .
Territorial competence will depend ... on whether there is, substantively, a
real and substantial connection between the enacting jurisdiction and the facts
on which the proceeding in question is based. This provision would bring the
law on jurisdiction into line with the concept of 'properly restrained
jurisdiction' that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Morguard Investments
Ltd. v. De Savoye, 3 S.C.R. 1077 (1990), held was a precondition for the
recognition and enforcement of a default judgment throughout Canada. . . .
The present Act, if adopted, will ensure that all judgments will satisfy the
Supreme Court's criterion of 'properly restrained' jurisdiction, which the
court laid down as the indispensable requirement for a judgment to be
entitled to recognition at common law throughout Canada.
Canada,
of
Conference
Law
Uniform
See
http://www.ulcc.calen/us/UniformCourtJurisdiction+_Proceedings TransferActEn.
pdf (see "Uniform Statutes"; then see Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings
Transfer Act, Introductory Comments, comment 02).
11. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Acts were enacted in most provinces
during the first part of the last century. E.g., S.S., 1996, c. R-3.1. These Acts provide for
recognition and enforcement of judgments of reciprocating provinces, some states of the
United States and a few countries. This legislation is subject to the more recent
constitutional principles set out in Morguard Trust v. De Savoye and Hunt v. T&N plc,
supra note 8.
12. A comparison between the approach of the Lugano Convention and that of
recent Canadian statutory measures would be incomplete without reference to the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which provides a structure for the
recognition and enforcement of non-Canadian judgments. However, since the Lugano
Convention leaves recognition of judgments from non-Convention states to the domestic
conflict-of-laws rules of each state party to the Convention, such a comparison is not
possible without examining the recognition rules of all such states. The author of this
article has made no attempt to do this. However, see generally Charles Platto and
William Horton, Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Worldwide (Graham & Trotman and
International Bar Assn. 2nd ed. 1993).
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JUDGMENTS AMONGST SUB-UNITS

Both systems have been designed to function in the context of
political structures, the European Union (plus Norway and Switzerland),
on the one hand, and Canada, on the other, which have subunits-states
or provinces-with constitutional power with respect to recognition and
enforcement of money judgments. The public policy that both the
Convention and the Uniform Act were designed to implement is the
facilitation of commercial relationships between persons in different
states or provinces by providing a high level of predictability that a
judgment obtained in one such state or province will be recognized and
enforced in another state or province. It has been observed that the
Lugano Convention, reflecting the commercial policies of the European
Union, ensures that there is "free movement of judgments to secure
adequate legal protection of individuals and enterprises" 3 by providing a
structure through which countries can "trust each others' legal systems
and judiciaries." 4 The commentary to the Uniform Act includes in the
list of purposes of the Act the replacement of "widely different
jurisdictional rules currently used in Canadian courts with a uniform set
of standards for determining jurisdiction" and, "by providing uniform
jurisdictional standards, to provide an essential complement to the rule of
nation-wide enforceability of judgments in the uniform Enforcement of
Canadian Judgments Act."'
III.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES-IMPLEMENTING UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR
JURISDICTIONS AND RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS

Rules of law that address jurisdiction can be seen as having two
objectives. One of these (hereinafter, "objective one") is to prescribe
clear, consistent tests under which it can be determined which court(s)
has jurisdiction to address a dispute or grant a declaratory judgment. The
principal purpose of this objective is to tell plaintiffs where they must
bring their actions for judgments that will be recognized by other
political units bound by the system, and to tell defendants where they can
be expected to defend actions against them.
Features characteristic of systems designed to implement this
objective include specific, limited tests for jurisdiction and power given
to courts of one political unit to refuse to enforce a judgment of a court
of another political unit that took jurisdiction on an impermissible basis.
In its purest form, objective one precludes forum shopping and the

13.
14.
15.

Id. at 153.
Id.
Introductory Comments, supra note 10, at comments 0.1(1) and (3).
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possibility of conflicting decisions dealing with the same dispute
between the same parties. Furthermore, it precludes the possibility that a
court will decline jurisdiction on the basis that a court of another political
unit is a more appropriate forum to address a proceeding.
The second objective (hereinafter, "objective two") has a different
focus. It is to provide rules for identifying those fora, the judgments of
which will be recognized by other political units bound by the system.
The objective is not to provide a high level of predictability as to the
jurisdiction in which an action will be heard. Its primary focus is on
recognition and enforcement. It is designed to implement a "full faith
and credit system" similar to the one that is constitutionally prescribed in
the United States.' 6 A judgment of a court that took jurisdiction on the
basis of one of a number of specific criteria must be recognized and
enforced in all other political units that have adopted the same criteria.
The jurisdiction of a court that issues a judgment in one political unit
cannot be questioned when that judgment is being enforced in another.17
Under this approach, the plaintiff may choose any one of the available
fora in which to bring its action with the assurance that, under normal
circumstances, a judgment obtained will be recognized and enforced in
all other political units that participate in the system. Endemic to this
approach is the potential for forum shopping by the plaintiffs and a
possible logistical advantage for a plaintiff who decides to bring an
action in a forum that entails significant cost and inconvenience for a
defendant. However, abuse of this feature of the system can be
controlled through collateral mechanisms such as power given to a court
to refuse to hear a case (a forum non conveniens ruling) or to transfer it
to a court of another political unit that is a more appropriate forum.
In the following paragraphs of this article, the author describes the
extent to which the Convention and the Uniform Act fulfill the objectives
described above. The focus is on the non-specific rules of the
Convention and Uniform Act dealing with court jurisdiction in cases
involving proceedings arising out of contractual relationships.1 8
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
17. For example, the Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees
Act, s. 6(3) provides that when a judgment of another Canadian court is tendered for
registration as the judgment of the enforcing court, the court "shall not make an order
staying or limiting the enforcement of a registered Canadian judgment solely on the
grounds that (i) the judge or tribunal that made the judgment lacked jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the proceedings that led to the judgment or over the party against whom
the enforcement is sought under the principles of private international law or (ii) the
domestic law of the province or territory where the judgment was made."
18. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1998 OJ. (L 339) 3
[hereinafter Lugano Convention] (providing rules for jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments). The Lugano Convention provides jurisdiction rules applicable to a range of
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It has been recognized by the author that there exists a substantial
body of jurisprudence dealing with provisions of the Convention (or its
predecessors, the Brussels Convention and former Lugano Convention)
that bears on the interpretation and application of these provisions. By
the same token, there are decisions of Canadian courts dealing with
provisions of the Uniform Act and the common-law concept of "real and
However, extensive analysis of this
substantial connection."
jurisprudence has not been included in this article.
IV. OVERVIEW
It is clear that the approach of the Convention is to implement both
objectives one and two described above, while that of the Uniform Act is
to implement primarily objective two. 19 The Uniform Act addresses
objective one to the extent necessary to facilitate objective two.2 0 The
Convention has been designed to provide much greater certainty and,
consequently, uniformity, through the prescription of two factors on
which jurisdiction and recognition are based: domicile of the defendant
and place of contractual performance. Article 2 § 1 provides that an
action against persons domiciled in a state bound by the Convention shall
be brought in the courts of that state.21 Article 5 §1 permits an action
relating to a contract in the state where the contract was performed or
was to be performed.22
The Uniform Act is less restrictive in this respect and, consequently,
offers a lower level of predictability. Section 3 provides for the
actions that do not fall within the commercial classification such as actions in tort (art. 5
§ 3); actions for restitution for criminal acts (art. 5 § 4); actions against settlors, trustees
or beneficiaries under trusts (art. 5 §6); actions relating to consumer contracts (art. 5 § 4)
and employment contracts (art. 5 § 5). The Convention provides special rules for actions
relating to insurance (art. 5 § 3); actions involving claims to rights in rem to immovable
property, including tenancies of immovable property (art. 22 § 1); actions relating to the
constitutional aspect of legal person (art. 22 § 2); actions involving the validity of an
entry in a public registry (art. 22 § 3) and proceedings concerning intellectual-property
rights (art. 22 § 4).
The Uniform Act contains special rules applicable to actions involving arrest of
vessels (§ 5), proprietary or possessory rights in property (§ 9(a)), a trust (§ 9(d)),
restitutionary obligations (§ 9)(f)), tort (§ 9(h)), determination of personal status (§ 9(j))
and recover taxes (§ 9(1)).
19. The companion Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act provides a
uniform system for registration and enforcement on Canadian judgments. Under this
legislation, a judgment of a court of another Canadian province or territory must be
registered and enforced in another Canadian province or territory.
20. Both systems recognize the jurisdiction of a court: (i) designated in a forumselection agreement between the parties; (ii) to which the defendant has submitted; and
(iii) in counterclaim proceedings against a plaintiff in another action brought before the
court. See Lugano Convention art. 6 § 3, art. 23, art. 24; Uniform Act §§ 4(a)-(c).
21. Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art. 2 § 1.
22. Id. at art. 5 § 1.
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"territorial competence" of a court (jurisdiction to hear an action and
render judgment, also referred to as jurisdiction simpliciter2 ) if the
defendant is ordinarily resident in the province or territory of the court at
the time of commencement of the proceedings that led to the judgment or
if there is "a real and substantial connection" between the province or
territory of the court and the facts on which the proceedings against the
person were based.2 4 Section 10 of the Act sets out a non-exhaustive list
of factors that, if established, give rise to a presumption that a real and
substantial connection exists between the case and the forum. This
provision is examined later in this article.
V.

INPERSONAMJURISDICTION

Both the Convention and the Uniform Act provide for court
jurisdiction based on personal factors associated with the defendant. As
noted above, Article 2 of the Convention provides that, subject to
specified exceptions, actions against a person must be brought in the
jurisdiction in which the person is domiciled. However, the Convention
contains no definition of "domicile" in cases involving defendants who
are natural persons. The matter is left to the internal law of the forum
state (Article 59). The result is the potential for forum shopping where
there is a difference in approach taken under the law of states as to what
constitutes domicile. Article 6(1) provides a special rule applicable in
situations where there are two or more defendants with separate
domiciles. In such a case, the action may be brought in any one of the
domiciles so long as the claims are "so closely connected that it is
Since this
expedient to hear and determine them together."
determination is made by the forum court, the certainty of the domicile
rule is diminished.
Where the defendant is a "company or other legal person or
association of natural or legal persons," alternatives are provided.
Article 60 provides that when this type of defendant is involved, the
person is deemed to be domiciled in a state where the defendant has its
"statutory seat,"2 central administration or principal place of business.
If one of these is a state bound by the Convention, the Convention

23. See Uniform Act § 3. This term denotes jurisdiction other than "subject-matter
competence," which relates to restrictions on the court's authority such as the nature of
the dispute and the amount in issue.
24. This formulation was introduced by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard
Trust v. De Savoye, supra, note 8.
25. In the context of the United Kingdom, this means the defendant's place of
registered office, if one, and otherwise in the place of incorporation or formation (Art.
60(3)).
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applies. Where two or more of these are states bound by the Convention,
presumably the choice of the forum is left to the plaintiff.
The Uniform Act provides that a court has jurisdiction if, at the time
of commencement of the proceedings, the defendant was "ordinarily
resident" in the forum province (Section 3(d)). The Act does not define
the term "ordinarily resident" as it applies to natural persons. The
Uniform Law Conference concluded that this should not result in
uncertainty because the term has been defined in numerous cases
involving other statutes and any "express statutory definition would
probably fail to match the existing concept and would therefore provide
defendants are involved
difficulty rather than certainty. ,,26twWhere two deednsaeivld
and only one is ordinarily resident in the forum province, there is no
presumption that the court has jurisdiction with respect to the second
defendant unless the proceeding has a real and substantial connection to
the forum province.
As is the case with the Convention, the Act provides rules
determining when a corporation is ordinarily resident in a province.
Section 7 lists alternative factors, more numerous and less restrictive
than those of the Convention.2 7 Under the Convention, an organization is
deemed to be located in a state if it has its principal place of business in
that state. Under the Uniform Act, all that is required is that the
organization have a place of business (whether principal or otherwise) in
the province, have or be required to have a registered office (which need
not be it "statutory seat") in the province, or have an office or agency in
the province at which service of process may be effected.
VI. NON-PERSONAL FACTORS

The uncertainty associated with the lack of a definition of personal
domicile, referred to above, and the alternatives available in the case of a
corporate defendant is increased in the context of commercial contracts
falling within the scope of this paper by Article 5 of the Convention.
Under Article 5(1)(a), a plaintiff can disregard the defendant domicile
rule of Article 2 where the matter relates to a contract.28 The action may
be brought by a plaintiff in the "place of performance of the obligation in
question."29 Article 5(l)(b) provides that, in the context of a sale of
goods, this is the place where the goods were delivered or should have
been delivered, and in the context of a contract for the provision of
26. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, supra note 10, comment 7.2.
27. Where a partnership is involved, the connecting factors are registered office,
place of business or central management in the province (section 8).
28. See Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art. 5(1)(a).
29. Id.
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services, this is the place where the services were provided or should
have been provided.o

However, other than proceedings involving contracts for the sale of
goods or services, the Convention provides no guidance as to the
meaning of "place of performance of the obligation in question."31 Since
a single contract may provide for several obligations, it appears possible
that actions involving such a contract may be brought in any one of
different fora. This uncertainty has been the source of considerable
litigation before the European Court of Justice, which has not provided a
definitive approach.32
The approach contained in Article 5(1) of the Convention is
implemented on a somewhat expanded scale by section 3 of the Uniform
Act. In the case of litigation involving a commercial contract, a court
has jurisdiction if there is a real and substantial connection between that
province and the facts on which the proceedings against the defendant
were based (Section 3(e)).33 Section 10 of the Act sets out a nonexclusive list of factors that, if extant, give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that such a connection exists.34 The features of this
provision most relevant to a non-specific commercial contract are set out
in sections 10(e) and 10(h).35 A court is presumed to have jurisdiction
where the action involves breach of contractual obligations that, to a
substantial extent, were to be performed in the province where the court
In addition, a court has presumed
is located (Section 10(e)(i)).36
jurisdiction where the action concerns contractual obligations where the
contract resulted from a solicitation of business in the province of the
forum by or on behalf of the seller (section 10(e)(iii)(B)) or where the
action "concerns a business carried on in" the forum province (Section
10(h)). It is not a requirement in the context of the latter factor that the
action involve performance of the contract in that province. Another
factor that connects the proceedings to a province is the designation of

30. See id. art. 5(1)(b).
31. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contract Obligations (Rome
Convention), June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 226) (providing guidance on rules determining
the law applicable to most contractual obligations).
32. See generally, R. Kelly & Grace O'Connor, Article 5(1) of The Brussels
Regulation: Internal Conflict in the Conflict OfLaws, 4 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 11

(2008-09).
33. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform Court
JurisdictionandProceedings TransferAct, supranote 10, § 3(e).
34. See id. § 10.
35. See id §§ 10(e), 10(h).
36. See id. § 10(e)(i).
37. See id. § 10(e)(iii)(B), 10(h).
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the law applicable to the contract made "in express terms" by the parties
to the contract (Section 10(e)(ii)).3 8
A factor often associated with commercial contracts that induces the
presumption that there is a real and substantial connection between a
proceeding and a province is the location in that province of movable or
immovable property where a party to the proceedings is seeking a ruling
as to proprietary or possessory rights or a security interest in the property
(Section 10(a)).3 9
VII. COMPARISON OF THE CANADIAN UNIFORM ACT AND THE
CONVENTION

LUGANO

It is reasonable for comparison purposes to treat "domicile" referred
to in Article 2 of the Convention and "ordinary residence" referred to in
section 3(d) of the Uniform Act as rough equivalents. Furthermore, there
are parallels between the two systems with respect to the second major
test of jurisdiction prescribed by the Convention. Section 5(1)(b) of the
Convention refines the "place of performance of the obligation" factor in
the context of contracts for the sale of goods or the provision of services
40
as the state where the delivery occurred or should have occurred.
While there is no similar statutory refinement of the meaning of place of
performance in section 10(e)(i) of the Uniform Act, in many cases, this
will be the place of delivery of goods or services under a sales or service
contract.
The equivalent of the Article 5(1)(a) of the Convention test
contained in section 10(e) of the Uniform Act refers to the jurisdiction in
which the contractual obligations to "a substantial extent" were to be
performed. The provision directs the court applying the section to focus
on the feature of the contract that involves substantial performance where
there is more than one performance obligation. While it provides
somewhat more guidance than does section 5(l)(a), it still entails an
assessment as to which performance obligation required of each party to
the contract is the most substantial. Where it is clear that one party has
38. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform Court
Jurisdictionand Proceedings TransferAct, supra note 10, § 1O(e)(ii).
39. See id. § 10(a) (alluding to a rough equivalence applicable only to immovable
property is contained in the Convention); see Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art.
6(4) (providing an alternative to the place of domicile of the defendant where contract
proceedings against the defendant can be combined with proceedings against the same
defendant involving rights in rem in immovable property, where in such a case, the action
may be brought in the court of the state where the property is situated); see also, Lugano
Convention, supra note 23, art. 22 (explaining a court of the state in which immovable
property is situated has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to actions involving rights to
the property).
40. See Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art. 5(l)(b).
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the dominant obligations (e.g., the seller who must deliver goods) the
"substantial" test must be applied where the performance is to occur in
two or more provinces.
However, the important difference between the approaches of the
Convention and the Model Act is not found in the detailed provisions
setting out specific jurisdictional factors. What is of much greater
significance is the extent to which each system recognizes the
jurisdiction of courts on the basis of factors other than domicile (ordinary
residence) or place of performance of contractual obligations. The
Convention is very limited in this respect. However, as noted above,
section 3(e) of the Uniform Act permits a court to take jurisdiction when
it concludes that there is "a real and substantial connection" between the
facts of the case and the province of the forum. The list of factors in
section 10 that require the conclusion that such a connection exists is not
exclusive. A court may decide that there are other factors that induce
this connection. Furthermore, section 12 of the Uniform Act recognizes
the power of a provincial legislature to grant or deny through other, more
focused, legislative provisions exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction to
courts on the basis of factors not recognized in the Act as giving
jurisdiction to these courts.4 1
The lack of prescription of the forum in which an action is to be
commenced embodied in the Uniform Act is further emphasized by
section 6, which empowers a court that does not otherwise have
jurisdiction to hear a case and issue a judgment where there is no court
outside the province in which the plaintiff can commence the
proceedings, or the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to commence
proceedings. When a court concludes that a court of another province
that does have jurisdiction is one in which the plaintiff cannot reasonably
be expected to bring his or her action, it is employing the principle of
forum non conveniens in reverse. This provision, which originated in
Article 3136 of the Quebec Civil Code, was apparently included ex
abundanti cautela. It is superfluous 42 and, perhaps, constitutionally
suspect. 43 It is inconceivable that this jurisdiction would ever be invoked
41. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Unform Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, supra note 10, § 12 (explaining the
constitutionality of such legislation can be questioned should it grant exclusive
jurisdiction on a basis that does not meet the "close and substantial" connection test
established by the Supreme Court).
42. See Saskatchewan, supra note 6 (explaining that enacted the Uniform Act did
not include this provision).
43. See Morguard Trust v. De Savoye, supra note 8 (discussing the provision could
well be called into question under the principle on a constitutional basis if the matter
involved falls within the jurisdiction of another forum, and the province of that forum has
not enacted this feature of the Uniform Act); see Janet Walker, Muscutt Misplaced: The
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on the ground that there is no Canadian court readily available to the
plaintiff.
VIII. LIS PENDENS AND FORUM NON CONVENENS

Two different scenarios may involve actions commenced in courts
of two jurisdictions relating to the same matter between the same parties.
The first is where both courts have jurisdiction under the rules of the
system. The second is where there is temporary uncertainty as to
whether the court first seized with the action has jurisdiction, but it is
clear that the second court does.
The Convention recognizes that in rare situations duplicate
proceedings may be started in courts of different states that have
jurisdiction in the same matter between the same parties. However,
rather than giving to the courts the power to determine which of the two
is the most appropriate under the circumstances,44 Articles 27-29 provide
a first-in-time rule. The court first seized is given priority, and the other
court must stay the proceedings before it.45 Under Article 27, where
related actions are involved, a court may decline jurisdiction in favour of
another court first seized with jurisdiction.
The first-in-time approach also applies to cases falling within the
second scenario. A court in which an action is brought must stay
proceedings until it has been determined whether another court before
which an action involving the same parties and the same issues was
earlier brought has jurisdiction. If that jurisdiction is established, the
second court must stay proceedings before it.
Essentially the same approach applies where the court of another
state has taken jurisdiction on a basis other than that permitted by the
Convention. Under Article 26(1), it is up to the court first seized with the
matter to voluntarily decline to hear the case unless the defendant has
entered an appearance. However, as a result of Article 27(1), the court
that clearly has jurisdiction must not proceed with an action brought

Future of Forum of Necessity Jurisdiction in Canada, 48 CAN. Bus. L.J. 135 (2009)
(examining the doctrinal basis for what is described as "forum of last resort").
44. See Lugano Convention, supra note 23 (discussing how inflexible
implementation of objective one noted above leaves little room for the application of the
principle of forum non conveniens that could otherwise be used to address cases falling
within the first scenario); see Owusu v. Jackson, C-281/02 (discussing that the European
Court of Justice has held that the principle is not consistent with the Convention); see
also Gilles Cumiberti, Current Developments, Private International Law, Forum Nonconveniens and the Brussels Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 980 (2005) (discussing
criticism of this conclusion).
45. See Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art. 30 (addressing the all-important
question as to when proceedings have started in a jurisdiction).
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before it until the issue of the first court's jurisdiction is determined by
the first court (Article 27(1)).46
The system implemented by the Convention under which an action
in one jurisdiction necessarily results in a stay of an action relating to the
same matter between the same parties in another jurisdiction provides
significant potential for abuse. A person who expects to be. sued for
breach of contract in a court of a state that clearly has jurisdiction can
delay commencement of the action by bringing a baseless action against
the potential plaintiff in another state alleging breach of the same
contract by the potential plaintiff. The effect of this is to invoke the stay
provided in Article 27(1) with respect to an action based on the contract
thereafter brought by the plaintiff against the person in a state that clearly
has jurisdiction under the Convention. This delays (possibly for many
years, depending upon efficiency of the court system of the state in
which the obstructing person brought his or her action) 47 a just
determination of the matter by the appropriate court. 4 8 In addition, it
places the plaintiff in the position of either having to argue before the
court in which the person's action was started that the court does not
have jurisdiction under the Convention, or avoiding participation in the
proceedings and seeking from the courts of the state or states in which
the judgment is to be enforced a ruling that the judgment should not be
recognized.49
Given the much less precise and less restrictive grounds in the
Uniform Act on which courts can take jurisdiction, theoretically, the risk
is much greater that duplicate proceedings will be started in two
provincial fora. Notwithstanding this, the Act contains no mechanism
equivalent to that of the Convention under which it can be determined
which proceeding may proceed and which must be temporarily or
permanently stayed. Nor is there any basis on which to determine which
of two judgments from courts in separate provinces is to prevail where
the courts in both provinces took jurisdiction on the basis of one of the
factors set out in section 3 of the Uniform Act. It is not possible for a
court in one province to conclude that a court in another province took
46. See id art. 35 (discussing it is open to the courts of a state to refuse to recognize a
judgment of a court of another state when the latter court took jurisdiction on a basis not
recognized by the Convention).
47. See Gasser v MISRAT, Case C- 116/02 (discussing that the European Court of
Justice ruled that delay in getting a court ruling is not grounds for refusing to apply
Article 27).
48. See Trasporti Castelletti v Hugo Trumpy, Case C-159/97, [1999] ECR 1-1597
(ECJ) (discussing that this approach was used to delay hearing of a case for eight years);
see aslo T. Hartley, The European Union and The Systematic Dismantling of the
Common Law Of Conflict OfLaws, 54 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 813, 815 (2005).
49. See Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art. 35.
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jurisdiction on an impermissible ground (i.e., the defendant was not
ordinarily resident in that province and there was no real and substantial
connection to the province).5 0 Furthermore, it is not possible for a court
to rule that the court of another province was a forum non conveniens.
Consequently, the common law "strong cause" principle no longer
applies, 5 1 and anti-suit injunctions cannot be used. 5 2
The Uniform Act does, however, provide two mechanisms through
which duplicate actions in different provinces can be avoided. The first
is statutory codification of the forum non conveniens principle. This is
addressed below. The second is a feature that dovetails with the
principle offorum non conveniens. Under sections 13-14 of the Act, a
court has the power to transfer all or part of proceedings to another court.
When a court that has both subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction
simpliciter concludes that it is not a forum non conveniens, it may
request that another court of another province or a court of a state that
has subject-matter competence and that is a more appropriate forum
accept all or part of the proceedings. Where the referring court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction simpliciter, the transfer
may be made to a court of another province or state that has both subjectmatter jurisdiction and jurisdiction simpliciter. Whether the court to
which the request for transfer is made has subject-matter jurisdiction or
jurisdiction simpliciter is determined under the law of that jurisdiction.

50. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform
Enforcement of CanadianJudgments Act, §§ 4, 6, available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/
index.cfm?sec=1&sub=lel (explaining the requirement of one province to recognize and
enforce a "Canadian judgment" except in specified circumstances not relevant to the
matters examined in this paper. A court is expressly precluded from staying or limiting
the enforcement of a registered Canadian judgment on the grounds that the judge or court
that made the judgment lacked jurisdiction over the judgment debtor under the principles
of private international law (Section 6(2)). The assumption of this Act is that the
judgment has been made by a court that has jurisdiction based on the rules set out in the
Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act. There is no similar limitation
on recognition under the Convention).
51. See Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. Ecu-Line N.V. [2003] 1 S.C.R.450 (discussing the
principle that a court has the power to conclude that, even though the foreign court had
jurisdiction on a basis recognized under the law of the domestic court (especially a
choice-for-forum clause in an agreement between the parties), there is a strong cause for
having the matter heard by the court and may proceed with the case).
52. See Amchem Productions Inc. v. British Columbia Workers' Compensation
Board [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (discussing an anti-suit injunction issued by a court that has
jurisdiction to hear an action, against a plaintiff who has brought an action involving the
same matter in the court of another jurisdiction in circumstance where the issuing court
concludes it would be "oppressive or vexation" for the action to proceed).
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A court is empowered to accept all or part of the proceeding transferred
from a court located in another jurisdiction.
IX. JURISDICTION SIMPLICITER AND FORUMNON CONVENENS

Notwithstanding the identification in the Uniform Act of specific
factors the existence of which, for the most part, dictate which court(s)
has jurisdiction, litigants in jurisdictions that have enacted it do not have
a high level of predictability with respect to jurisdiction simpliciter.
Uncertainty is endemic to the open-ended "real and substantial
connection" test. There remains considerable disagreement among
Canadian courts as to what factors the test contemplates. 54 Furthermore,
the value of the enumeration in section 10 of factors that give rise to the
presumption of real and substantial connection is diminished, in any
particular situation, by the possibility of one of the litigants establishing
that there is a real and substantial connection to at least two provinces
based on other factors.ss For example, in the context of litigation
involving a commercial contract, notwithstanding that the forum where
the substantial part of the contract obligations is to be performed has
jurisdiction under sections 3 and 10(e)(i), it is still open to one of the
litigants to demonstrate that the action has a closer and more substantial
connection to another province and that the action should be heard in a
court of that province.
The principal mechanism contained in the Uniform Act to address
this situation is the principle of forum non conveniens.5 6 Once a court

53. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform Court
Jurisdictionand Proceedings Transfer Act, supra, note 10, §§ 15-23 (providing detailed
rules dealing with the logistics of the transfer of proceeding from one court to another).
54. See, e.g., Muscutt v. Courcelles, [2002] 213 D.L.R. 577 (Can.); Stanway v.
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc., [2009] 314 D.L.R. 618 (Can.); In Van Breda et al. v. Village
Resorts Limited et al., [2010] 98 O.R. 721 (Can.) (discussing how the Ontario Court of
Appeal attempted (in the view of many, without success) to refine the factors involved in
the real and substantial connection test and remove the confusion between jurisdiction
simpliciter andforum non conveniens resulting from its decision is Muscutt); see also, T.
Monestier, A 'Real and Substantial' Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada, 33
QUEEN's L.J. 215 (2007).
See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, supra note 10, § 10 (quoting § 10 of the
Uniform Act provides in relevant part: "Without limiting the right of a plaintiff to prove
other circumstances that constitute a real and substantial connection between (this
province) and the fact on which a proceeding is based, a real and substantial connection
between (this province) and those facts is presumed to exist. . . .").
56. Currently, there appears to be some confusion in the case law as to whether the
factors enumerated in section 11 that are to be taken into account when applying the
forum non conveniens test play a role in the determination as to whether or not a court
has jurisdiction simpliciter. See Bouch v. Penny, [2009] 310 D.L.R. 433 (Can.); compare
Stanway v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc., [2009] 314 D.L.R. 618. (Can.).
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concludes on the basis of the factors set out in sections 3 and 10 that it
has jurisdiction simpliciter,it must then determine whether or not it is the
appropriate forum for the litigation. While the Uniform Act does not
expressly so state, this is practically a mandatory step in the process
when the defendant demonstrates that the action has a real and
substantial connection to another province as well. Among the factors
set out in Section 11(2) that a court must take into consideration when
determining whether or not to accept or decline jurisdiction are the
desirability of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or conflicting
decisions, the enforcement of an eventual judgment and "the fair and
efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole." What is
significant in this context is that it is up to one of the two courts involved
to decide that it is a forum non conveniens, leaving the action to be
determined by the other court.
Furthermore, a court may conclude that the action has its most real
and substantial connection to the province of that court but nevertheless
refuse to hear the case or may transfer it on the ground that, under the
circumstances, it is not the most appropriate forum for the action. As
noted above, section 11 of the Uniform Act provides that, after
considering the interests of the parties and the "ends of justice" the court
that has jurisdiction simpliciter may decline to exercise that jurisdiction
on the ground that a court of another province (or state) is a more
appropriate forum because, inter alia, it is more convenient and costeffective for parties and witnesses.
X.

IN SUMMARY

While the Convention, with its narrowly crafted tests for court
jurisdiction, provides a significant level of predictability for both
plaintiffs and defendants as to where an action must be commenced and
defended, it does not completely eliminate the potential for forum
shopping. By comparison, the imprecision of the "real and substantial
connection" test of the Uniform Act when coupled with the lack of
exclusiveness of the specifically enumerated factors in section 10 results
in greater opportunity for forum shopping and a lower level of
predictability for defendants as to where an action may have to be
defended, and for plaintiffs as to whether a court will hear a case.
The differing approaches embodied in the Convention and Uniform
Act can be explained, in part at least, by the contexts within which these
systems function. The Convention applies to thirty sovereign states,
many of which have very disparate legal and judicial systems. As a
result, the approach contained in it is, perhaps, justifiably much more
prescriptive than that contained in the Uniform Act, which was designed
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to apply to thirteen jurisdictions in one country, all of which have similar
judicial systems that function in the context of a single constitutional
structure. While the Uniform Act has been designed to provide
jurisdictional parameters for Canadian courts, its principal focus is on
ensuring that judgments of the courts of one province are recognized and
enforced in other provinces. The retention of the principle offorum non
conveniens and the power to transfer and receive transfers of proceedings
coupled with the inability of a court in a province to question the
jurisdictional basis of a decision of a court in another province
demonstrates a high degree of faith that Canadian courts will ensure that
inefficiencies in and abuse of the system will be avoided. It remains to
be seen whether this faith is warranted.
However, context does not explain entirely the difference in
approach between the two systems. Essentially, the same approach to
jurisdiction simpliciter contained in the Uniform Act is also contained in
the Canadian Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act57
applicable to non-Canadian judgments. The only significant difference
between recognition and enforcement of domestic and foreign judgments
is that in the latter case, the Canadian court has authority to refuse to
recognize a foreign judgment on the basis of specified grounds" or the
conclusion that it was inappropriate for the foreign court to take
jurisdiction.
If the two approaches are assessed on the basis of public policy, the
outcome may not heavily favour one approach over the other. No doubt,
the approach of the Convention provides a much higher level of

57. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, supra note 3.
58. See Lugano Convention, supra note 23, arts. 33-35 (discussing grounds are very
similar to those set out in Articles 33-35 of the Convention).
59. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, § 4, 6, 10, available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/
us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1e5 (discussing judgments obtained by fraud or rendered in a
proceeding that was conducted contrary to the principles of procedural fairness and
natural justice or manifestly contrary to public policy in the province, or a judgment
based on facts in a proceeding pending in the province or a judgment of a court of the
province. Section 10 gives to the court before which the application for recognition is
brought the power to refuse recognition, even where the foreign court had jurisdiction
under the recognition rules set out in the Act (other than where there was a real and
substantial connection between the state of the foreign court and the facts on which the
proceeding was based), when "it was clearly inappropriate for the (foreign) court to take
jurisdiction").
A novel feature of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, not directly related to
recognition, is the requirement in section 6 that the recognizing court limit the amount of
non-compensatory damages awarded by the foreign court to an amount similar to an
amount that could be awarded by the recognizing court. The court may reduce a foreign
damage award that is "excessive in the circumstances" to an amount not less than that
which the enforcing court could have awarded in the circumstances.
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predictability for both plaintiffs and defendants. However, there is
"another side to the coin" when it comes to assessing the relative benefits
of the two systems. The potential for obstructive actions on the part of
defendants is much greater under the first-in-time system of the
Convention. The Uniform Act contains no first-in-time rule. However,
it contains two features that minimize at least some of the problems that
the first-in-time rule addresses: the power to transfer all or part of an
action to another court, and the power of a court to rule that it is a forum
non conveniens.60
In any event, the dominant, although not universal,' Canadian view
is that rigid certainty as to where an action must be commenced and
defended is not necessarily a feature that is to be implemented at all
costs. It is not the only public policy that should be embodied in law
dealing with court jurisdiction and judgment recognition. A feature of
the Uniform Act necessarily associated with the more flexible approach
to jurisdiction it embodies is the opportunity for a court to facilitate
justice and fairness as a minor aspect of the close and substantial test and
through the exercise of the forum non conveniens principle. It may be
clear that a provincial court has jurisdiction under one or more of the
statutory tests, but it may not be so clear that justice and fairness to the
defendant will result if the action were to be heard by that court. The
facts of the case may dictate that these goals can be realized only if the
action were heard by a court of another jurisdiction that has a real and
substantial connection to the action.

60. See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Statutes, Uniform Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, supra note 10 (referencing that these
measures do not provide a solution where a court proceeds to hear a case even though a
court of another jurisdiction concludes that that first-mentioned court does not have
jurisdiction simpliciter or is aforum non conveniens).
61. See Jean-Gabriel Castel, The Uncertainty Factor in Canadian Private
InternationalLaw, 52 MCGILL L.J. 555 (2007) (citing a senior Canadian legal expert on
Canadian conflict of law who favours the "certainty" approach and is very critical of
recent Canadian judicial and legislative developments in the area of jurisdiction).

